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Introduction
There is now an extensive literature which suggests that affiliates of foreign-owned firms outperform domestic firms and pay higher wages. However, as often noted (e.g. Girma, Greenaway & Wakelin 2001 ) much of this difference may be due to differences in other characteristics of firms which are correlated with foreign ownership. For example, affiliates of foreign-owned firms tend to be larger and operate in sectors of the economy which are inherently more productive. It is therefore important to control for firm size and sectoral distribution when comparing the wages and productivity of foreign and domestic firms. Since these characteristics are often observable in plant-or firm-level data, controlling for these differences is straightforward in a regression framework.
A potentially more difficult problem is that foreign and domestic firms might differ in their unobservable characteristics. In particular, firms which are taken into foreign ownership might already be outperforming firms which are not taken over. With repeated observations at the plant-level, it is possible to remove the influence of any fixed difference between firms which become foreign-owned and those which remain domestic by using difference-in-differences (DiD) or fixed effects (FE) techniques. However, it is difficult with plant-level data to control for differences in the quality of the workforce which may explain some of the apparent foreign-ownership wage premium.
In this study we use a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany for the years 2000 and 2004, and provide estimates of the wage effects of foreign-affiliates in (the former) East and West Germany. In addition, the wage effects of the large number of West German affiliates which are located in East Germany are also considered. The implemented techniques allow us to control both for worker-and plant-level unobserved components of earnings.
In the light of the recent literature on policy evaluation, we think of a change in ownership as a "treatment" which potentially affects the wage paid to workers in the plant. This allows us to partition the wage gap between different types of plant in terms of "selection" and "takeover". Selection reflects the fact that plants are not randomly selected into their ownership status. Takeover measures any additional wage gain which a change in ownership status yields.
This framework is also helpful in investigating whether any wage gain from ownership status is internalised within the firm, or whether there are spillovers to the domestic economy. We can do this by examining the wage changes of workers who move from foreign-owned to domestic plants, and by examining the wage changes of plants which revert to domestic control.
The use of data on workers and firms also allows us to investigate whether there are any distributional consequences of ownership status. For example, foreign-owned firms may implement a steeper wage-tenure profile, or they may change relative rewards to different skill groups.
We find evidence of large selection effects both in terms of worker and firm unobserved components of wages: plants which get taken over by foreign firms have higher plant-level wages and higher individual-level wages before they are taken over. The selection effect is larger for plants in East Germany. Once the selection effect is taken into account, the genuine takeover effect is small and in some cases insignificantly different from zero. The takeover effect is slightly larger in West Germany.
The paper is structured as follows. We summarise previous estimates of the wage effect in Section 2, and we present a framework for measuring wage effects in Section 3 which explores the different empirical issues which may arise. Section 4 briefly describes the data we use, and our estimates are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Previous estimates
As noted, there is now a wide range of estimates of the wage impact of foreign affiliates. As always, it is difficult to make direct comparisons across these studies because of differences in methods, samples, data and so on. Nevertheless, Appendix Table A .1 attempts to draw together the relevant comparisons for as many studies as possible.
As can be seen, the 18 studies have been carried out for various developed and developing countries. They have been conducted either at the industry-or firm-level and more recently -as employer-employee data have become available -at the individual-level. The studies can also be broadly classified according to the identification of the ownership wage premium. The first group compares wages (or wage growth) between foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants, which is typically carried out by OLS. In this case, one can condition on human-capital and plant-characteristics available in the respective data-set, but not on unobservables. Hence, the obtained ownership effect may be confounded by a selection effect if foreign-and domestically-owned firms differ in unobserved characteristics. To circumvent this problem, some studies identify the wage differential by comparing the change in wages of plants which change ownership and the change in wages of plants which do not. This is achieved by fixed-effects or difference-in-difference methods, by which unobserved time-invariant differences between both plant-types are swept away. Obviously, this is only possible if the data cover more than one period in time.
By analogy, if the analysis is based on a panel of linked employer-employee data (LEED), one can compare the wage growth of workers who experience a change in their employer's ownership status with the wage growth of workers whose employer's ownership status does not switch. A reported change in ownership status at the individual-level can occur for two reasons. First, the plant for which an individual works changes its nationality. Second, the individual moves to another plant with a different ownership status. While Martins (2006) and Heyman, Sjöholm & Tingvall (2004) use the former (and explicitly rely on workers staying in the same firm) to identify the ownership differential, the studies of Pesola (2006) and Balsvik (2006) are based on movement of workers.
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To the best of our knowledge, no study derives (and contrasts) separate estimates of the ownership wage differential based on the two alternative sources of ownership variation.
Some of these studies only investigate the effect of becoming foreign-owned (Martins (2006) , Heyman et al. (2004) , Girma & Görg (2006) ) or restrict the effects of going from domestic to foreign and of going from foreign to domestic as being equal and opposite (Earle & Telegdy (2006) ). Conyon, Girma, Thompson & Wright (2002) is the only study at the plant level which also considers the effect of changing from foreign-to domestically owned, although their control group comprises firms of both ownership types not changing their status. Balsvik (2006) looks separately at both directions of movement at the individual-level. In separate regressions, she compares movers to non-multinationals (MNE) and movers to MNE with stayers. The reference group comprises in the first case stayers in non-MNE and in the second case stayers in MNE. Pesola (2006) specifies a regression model which includes a foreign ownership dummy and its interaction with tenure and which allows the impact of previous experience to vary with the ownership of the previous and the current employer (such that there are four groups: domestic-domestic; domestic-foreign; foreign-domestic and foreign-foreign).
There is a common consent from all studies that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages. The premium appears to be much larger in less developed countries (the reported (raw) wage differential amounts to 65% for Ghana and ranges in Indonesia even between 67 and 90%), but lies for developed countries at least somewhere between 10 and 30%. We can also regard it as a stylized fact that the differential reduces after including human capital variables of the workers and/or characteristics of the firm (of which sectoral affiliation and firm size seem to be the most important). Nevertheless, if unobserved factors are not taken into account, a positive foreign wage differential remains. This is typically around 10% and the difference between developed and less-developed countries is much less pronounced. There is, of course, some variation between countries, but this may at least partly reflect different sets (or qualities) of control variables. However, studies which also account for unobserved factors often find no or only a very small wage premium.
It is often found that the foreign ownership wage differential rises with skill (Feenstra & Hanson (1997) for Mexico, Earle & Telegdy (2006) for Hungary, Lipsey & Sjöholm (2004) for Indonesia, Velde & Morrissey (2001) for sub-Saharan countries).
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According to Görg, Strobl & Walsh (2002) , one explanation for this is that firm specific training is more productive in foreign firms. Using data for Ghana, the authors can provide evidence for their hypothesis by distinguishing between whether individuals work in domestic or foreign-owned firms, and whether they receive on-the-job training. Relatedly, Pesola (2006) obtains that the positive wage effect of prior experience in foreign-owned firms is driven by the effect on the earnings of highly educated. Earle & Telegdy (2006) also uses LEED data, but in their data workers cannot be tracked over time due to the omission of workers' identification codes.
This is not supported, however, by the findings of Buckey & Enderwick (1983) and Girma & Görg (2006) for the UK.
In this paper we clarify the appropriate methodology for estimating the wage effect of foreign ownership when one has access to linked employer-employee data. We provide more comprehensive evidence consistent with the idea that foreign-owned firms "select" highwage plants and high-wage workers. We also present some evidence consistent with the idea that wage gains in foreign-owned plants may "spill over" to workers' subsequent jobs.
Measuring direct wage effects of MNEs
Let y it be worker i's wage in period t. There are only two waves, t = 1 (namely 2000) and t = 2 (2004). The sample for these models is all workers who are observed twice. In each period, the identity of a worker's plant is given by j = J (i, t) . Note that the ownership status of worker i's current plant may change either because the worker moves from one plant to another of different ownership status, or because the plant itself changes status.
The simplest framework in which to consider the wage effects of ownership is a standard linear two-way error components model:
The vector of observable characteristics z could be partitioned into those which vary across individual workers, and those which vary across individual plants. The variable F jt is unity if the worker's plant is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. λ 1 and λ 2 are standard macro effects.
Following Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999) , θ i and ψ j represent unobserved components of wages which are time-invariant at the individual-and plant-level respectively. θ i might be thought of as "unobserved ability", while ψ j might be related to the unobserved fixed productivity of a particular plant, if we think that more productive plants pay higher wages. As both might be correlated with foreign ownership, we have a two-way fixed-effects model.
Defining the treatment and comparison groups
A natural interpretation of a foreign ownership takeover is that of a "treatment". In other words, we wish to estimate the effect on average workers' wages in domestic firms in t = 1 of becoming foreign-owned in t = 2. Similarly, we wish to estimate the effect on average workers' wages in foreign firms in t = 1 of becoming domestically-owned in t = 2. Some models (such as a standard fixed-effects model) suggest that these two effects should be equal and opposite, in which case we could pool the two types of takeover. But we do not wish to impose this restriction because it is possible, for example, that the wage benefits of foreign takeover are not reversed when plants revert to domestic control. We therefore consider these two cases separately.
Thus define the first treatment group to be those workers which are in domestic plants at t = 1 and which are in foreign-owned plants at t = 2. The comparable control group are those workers which remain in domestic plants at t = 1 and t = 2. There are analogous treatment and control groups consisting of those workers in foreign-owned plants at t = 1. In what follows we consider only the first comparison.
Controlling for differences in θ i
Keeping only those individuals who are in domestic plants at t = 1, if we difference Equation (1) we can remove the individual-level fixed effects:
where
For workers who do not change plant, ∆ψ j = 0. Now drop the observable covariates and it is easy to see that the OLS estimator of δ is the "raw" difference-indifference estimator,
where ∆ȳ T is the change in average wages of workers who are in the treatment group (those that become foreign-owned) and ∆ȳ C is the change in average wages in the control group. Equivalently, δ is the average wage of workers in foreign-owned plants relative to those in domestic-owned plants in t = 2 net of the gap between the same workers in t = 1, when they were all in domestically-owned plants. In these models δ is identified by those workers whose F jt changes. As noted, this occurs either if a plant changes ownership status or if a worker moves to a plant of another status.
It has been suggested that foreign-owned firms might be more selective in recruitment (e.g. Dale-Olsen 2003) , and employ workers with higher θ i , so that E(θ | F = 1) > E(θ | F = 0). We label this a worker selection effect.
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As just shown, with panel data on individuals it is straightforward to control for θ i by differencing.
To actually obtain an estimate of the differentialȳ T −ȳ C at t = 1, an alternative formulation of the differences-in-differences estimator is given by:
Here the time-invariant dummy variable T i is equal to one if the worker is in the treatment group and zero otherwise. When covariates are absent, this gives an identical estimate of δ above, but has the advantage that γ gives an estimate of the selection effect discussed above. Equivalently, workers might have been more productive already before they move to a foreign-owned plant.
A variant of this model is to fix covariates at their t = 1 values, because one might argue that some observables might themselves respond to potential foreign ownership effects.
Controlling for differences in ψ j OLS estimates of (2) will yield consistent estimates of δ if F J(i,t)t is uncorrelated with ∆ψ j . However, although we have a rich set of covariates (particularly at the plant level), and we can difference out θ i , it seems likely that foreign ownership is non-random with respect to unobservable plant-level determinants of wages. This is because foreign-owned firms might also select into plants which have some unobserved productivity advantage so that E( y jt is the average wage paid in plant j at time t etc. Now take first differences to get:
where, for example, ∆ȳ jt =ȳ jt −ȳ jt−1 . By analogy with the above, having controlled for observables, δ is the difference-in-difference estimator
where nowȳ refers to plant-level sample means.
Controlling for both selection effects
The problem with aggregating the data to the plant-level to difference out plant-level fixed effects is that estimates of δ from (5) will now be biased if ∆θ j is correlated with F jt . This is so-called aggregation bias, caused by the selection effect we cannot control for with plant-level data.
One advantage of linked employer-employee data is that one can eliminate both θ i and ψ j together. To do this, define a spell, denoted s, as a unique worker-plant pair. So a worker who changes plant between 2000 and 2004 has two separate spells. Within a spell both θ i and ψ j are constant (because both i and j are constant) and so one can eliminate both using "spell-fixed effects" (see Abowd et al. (1999) and ):
could (additionally) utilize these observations to estimate (1). However, using repeated cross-sections to obtain a difference-in-difference estimate relies on stronger assumptions (Lee & Kang 2006) .
Note that, when estimating Equation (6), individuals who change plant are not included in the regression and therefore do not contribute to the estimates of δ. Therefore one way of thinking about spell-fixed effects (F E(s) ) is that it controls for plant-level unobservables by only looking at "stayers". This is why Equation (2) contains the term ∆ψ j whereas Equation (6) does not. This is, in fact, essentially the same method suggested by Martins (2006) .
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Because (6) ignores information on movers, it is not the most efficient estimate of δ (or any other parameter). In addition, one cannot recover separately estimates of θ i or ψ j . An alternative method would be to estimate (2) but include a full set of (differenced) firm dummies to control for non-random selection on ψ j . However, this method is likely to be computationally infeasible since we have many thousands of plants. A solution to this problem is to use the Classical Minimum Distance (CMD) estimator outlined in in . It forms a restricted estimator for β, δ, λ and ψ from the parameters of (2) and (6) estimated separately.
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To summarise, if (1) represents the true process by which wages are generated, one can obtain consistent estimates of the foreign-ownership on wages using: (2) if ownership is non-random with respect to θ i ; (5) if ownership is non-random with respect to ψ j ; and (6) if ownership is non-random with respect to θ i and ψ j . More efficient estimates can also be obtained using a CMD estimate which combines both movers and non-movers.
All of the above is repeated for all foreign-owned plants in t = 1, some of whom become domestic (the second treatment group) in t = 2.
The data and descriptive statistics
There are two data sources. The first is the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung (IAB) Establishment Panel, an annual survey of approximately 8,250 plants located in the former West Germany and an additional 7,900 plants in the former East Germany. The survey started in 1993 and is ongoing. It covers 1% of all plants and 7% of all employment in Germany, and is therefore a sample weighted towards larger plants. Information is obtained by personal interviews with plant managers, and comprises about 80 questions per year, giving us information on, for example, total employment, bargaining arrangements, total sales, exports, investment, wage bill, location, industry, profit level and nationality of ownership. Ownership is defined as either West German, East German, foreign, or public.
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Complete information on plant ownership is available for all plants only in 2000 and 2004, so we restrict our analysis to those years. A detailed description of the IAB panel can be found in Kölling (2000) .
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Also note that, in the tables below, we decompose the OLS DiD/FE estimates into those for Movers only and Stayers only.
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See Wooldridge (2002, ch. 14.6 ) and for further details. Only a small proportion of plants in Germany are foreign-owned: 4% of all plants in West Germany and just 2% of all plants in East Germany are foreign-owned. A higher proportion of plants in the service sector are foreign owned. Turning to the employment shares, foreign ownership becomes more important. Almost one out of eight employees in West German manufacturing works for a foreign-owned plant because foreign-owned plants are on average larger. As we would expect, there is almost no ownership of West German plants by East German firms.
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By contrast, there is considerable cross-border ownership of East German plants by West German firms. About 11% of plants in East Germany are West Germanowned and the share of workers employed by theses establishments is nearly 30%. In the light of this considerable fraction, wage effects of West German-owned (as compared to East German-owned) plants in East Germany will also be of particular interest in the econometric analysis below.
The second source of data is the employment statistics register of the German Federal Office of Labour (Beschäftigtenstatistik ), which covers all employees or trainees registered by the social insurance system. The register covers about 80% of employees in West Germany and about 85% in East Germany. Information on employees includes basic demographics, start and end dates of employment spells, occupation and industry, earnings, qualifications (school and post-school), and a plant identification number. A detailed description of the employment data can be found in Bender, Haas & Klose (2000) .
By using the plant identification number we can associate each worker with a plant in the panel. We therefore observe approximately 80% of all workers in about 14,000 plants each year. Because the employment register is spell-based (one record for each employment spell), the combined data are potentially complex. To simplify, we select all employees in the employment register who are employed by the surveyed plants on June 30th each year. This yields an unbalanced annual panel of employees together with detailed information on the plants in which they work. We refer to the linked data as the Linked IAB panel, or LIAB.
Reported daily gross wages are censored at the social security contribution ceiling.
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Using wage data without any correction would generally yield estimates which are biased towards zero. One way to circumvent this problem is to apply a single imputation procedure, i.e. to impute all censored wages with estimated wages. Assuming that daily gross wages have a log-normal distribution, first a Tobit model is estimated, where the dependent variable is log daily gross wage and the independent variables are those included in further analyses. Then, for every censored observation a random value is drawn from a normal distribution which is left-truncated at the social security contribution ceiling (with predicted log wage as its mean and standard deviation as estimated from the Tobit model).
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Because the plant-level information in our data come from a survey, rather than an administrative source, we have a large number of measurable covariates, shown in Table B .1. We have rather less information on workers, shown in Table B .2.
Results
All our estimates can be thought of as variants of the basic difference-in-differences estimator described in Section 3. The basic model is an extension of Equation 4, which allows us to directly estimate both the selection effect and the takeover effect. Define the following dummy variables to measure the ownership status of a worker's plant in period t:
In West Germany we ignore E J(i,t)t = 1, and therefore we have only two treatment and control groups defined by the following dummies:
The ceiling is in 2000 at e 143.92 for West and at e 118.81 for East Germany. Our two DiD estimators for West Germany are therefore obtained from the following
for plants which are domestic at t = 1, and
for plants which are foreign-owned at t = 1.
For plants in East Germany there are six possible treatment and control groups. For example, T EW defines the group of plants who are domestic at t = 1 and become West German, while T EF defines the group who become foreign. Similarly we have T W E and T W F for plants which are West-German at t = 1 and T F E , T F W for plants which are foreign at t = 1. The three DiD equations for East Germany are therefore
for plants which are domestic at t = 1,
for plants which are West German-owned at t = 1 and
for plants which are foreign-owned at t = 1 The number of workers and plants for the different treatment and control groups in our regression sample is shown in the Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2, which also stratify between plant-stayers and movers. Each row in Table C .1 represents a control group and the associated treatment group for West Germany, while each row of and second, 450 workers move from West Germanowned to foreign-owned establishments. The estimated selection and takeover effects are identified by both types of workers. In contrast to previous studies, which relied either on stayers or on movers, in the analysis below we compare results based on the two sources of ownership-change.
West Germany
The first panel shows the raw difference-in-difference (DiD) estimate (Equation 3), which can be estimated either using OLS or fixed effects (FE). Our first basic result is that domestic firms which are taken over pay significantly higher wages before they are taken over. This is the coefficient on T F , estimated at 0.115 log-points. Similarly, foreign-owned firms which become domestic pay lower wages (−0.061) before they become domestic, but this effect is insignificantly different from zero. There is then an additional boost to wages of 0.043 log points after foreign takeover. This result is almost mirrored by firms which switch from foreign to domestic (−0.038 log points). In the raw data therefore, foreign firms appear to take over higher-paying domestic firms, but also boost wages after takeover. Foreign-owned firms which revert to domestic ownership do not pay significantly lower wages, but wages do drop significantly afterwards.
The raw DiD estimate controls for permanent differences in wages between plants which change ownership status and those that do not. These large differences (estimated to be about 10%) may in part be due to differences in observed characteristics, which we call x it and w jt . For example, firms which get taken over may be larger or in higher-paying industries. Incorporating a full set of time-varying controls in the basic DiD regression (as expected) reduces the estimate of γ W F from 0.115 to 0.056. Interestingly, the estimate of γ F W for plants which change from foreign to domestic changes sign and becomes positive and significant. In the raw data there appears to be negative selection: lower-paying firms switch from foreign to domestic. But this is due to time-varying differences in x it and w jt . The inclusion of covariates also reduces the takeover effect a lot: it reduces to 0.025 log points for switching from domestic to foreign, and it is virtually zero for plants which become domestic.
As has been noted above, because this is an individual-level wage equation, the estimates of δ F and δ W are driven both by plants which change their ownership status and by individuals who switch between plants of different ownership status. If movers are non-random with respect to ownership status, this might bias our DiD estimates. It is straightforward to control for this by looking at wages only of individuals who remain in the same plant. This reduces the takeover effect for plants which switch from domestic to foreign slightly (0.021 log-points), while the effect is larger for movers (0.055 log-points).
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The overall DiD estimate is a weighted average of the movers' and non-movers' estimates. As can be seen from Table C .1, only a small fraction of the sample comprise movers (4.6 % of the employees With respect to the change from foreign to domestic, the takeover effect is insignificantly different from zero for both, stayers and movers. However, the positive selection effect is only observed for stayers. It has been suggested that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages because they provide greater investment in human capital. If this human capital was general, the wage effects of foreign-ownership should "spillover" into the domestic economy when workers move from foreign-owned to domestically-owned establishments. Hence, we would expect to see smaller wage losses for movers from foreign to domestic plants than wage gains for movers from domestic to foreign. In fact -keeping in mind the relatively low number of movers-there is evidence for this in the conditional DiD estimates. owned may grow larger and pay higher wages. By including x it and w jt in the regression we incorrectly "control for" these changes. The alternative is to measure covariates only at t = 2000. This of course is only meaningful by looking at individuals who remain in the same plant. The estimated effect of becoming foreign-owned rises again to 0.041 log-points. 14 A generalisation of the DiD framework allows for individual-specific unobserved permanent components of wages, or unobserved fixed effects, labelled θ i . As we have a balanced panel (at the individual level) between t = 1 and t = 2 the average value of θ i is constant for the treatment and control groups, and so the raw fixed effects estimator gives identical estimates as the OLS DiD.
Using DiD or FE methods we can control for time and person-level fixed effects. We can additionally control for plant-level fixed effects by using spell-fixed effects (6). In fact, without covariates using spell-fixed effects is equivalent to using information only on stayers because for stayers ∆ψ j = ψ J(i,t) − ψ J(i,t−1) = 0. So the FE(s) results are identical to the stayers only model. Conditioning on covariates, we find that foreign takeover of domestic firms does boost wages, but only by about 0.027 log-points, or 2.7%. This is smaller than the selection effect for stayers. Domestic takeover of foreign firms appears to have a smaller, negative and statistically insignificant effect of −0.011. However, given the relatively large standard errors on these two estimates, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of takeover is equal and opposite. Thus, some of the effect on wages appears to be an effect which is gained when firms become foreign and is lost when they become domestic.
The final row reports estimates from our Classical Minimum Distance (CMD) method.
This method controls for both individual-and plant-fixed effects, and (unlike spell-fixed effects) includes both movers and non-movers. Reassuringly, we find that the CMD estimates are almost identical to the spell-fixed effects estimates, and so our preferred estimates appear robust to the choice of method. As noted in Section 3, it is also possible to estimate wage effects at the level of the plant. This is useful not least for comparison with the existing literature. Our estimates of the selection effect are generally bigger in the raw data (0.226 and −0.086). Without covariates the individual-level estimates are just a re-weighting of the plant level estimates, with larger plants having a higher weight. This shows that the selection effect is bigger for smaller plants. We would therefore expect that the inclusion of covariates (including firm size) in the plant-level estimates would reduce the selection effect, and this is indeed what happens.
14 In fact, this specification means that x it is a fixed effect, and so this estimator gives identical estimates of δ F and δ W as the raw DiD for plant-stayers.
East Germany
The East German results are more complex because there are three treatment/control groups, and two possible treatments for each group as shown in Equations (9)-(11). In Table 3 we report the two selection effects and the two takeover effects for each possible group at t = 1. The raw DiD estimates show first of all that the selection effect for domestic plants in 2000 is much larger than in West Germany. Plants which change from domestic to WestGerman pay 0.195 log-points more than those who remain domestic; plants which become foreign even pay 0.310 more. Once these large selection effects are taken into account, the takeover effect on wages is small and insignificantly different from zero. Selection effects for West German-owned and foreign-owned plants in 2000 are much smaller and insignificantly different from zero. Once again, the large selection effects for domestic plants which become foreign or West-German is consistent with the idea that higherpaying plants are those which get taken over. The selection effects reduce when covariates are taken into account (second panel), but remain substantial.
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The third and fourth panels show that these selection effects differ widely between stayers and movers. Workers who remain in the same plant have even larger selection effects, while they are insignificantly different from zero for workers who move. Note however that the selection effect is large and negative (albeit poorly determined) for movers from plants which were foreign-owned in 2000.
Our preferred estimates for the takeover effect are those which control for both worker and firm-fixed effects, labelled FE(s). In almost every case we find small and insignificant effects. The only exception is a fall of −0.053 log points for West German-owned plants which become domestic. Thus, we find that while selection is greater in East Germany, there is actually less evidence that takeover has any additional effect on wages.
It is also consistent with a model in which the effects of foreign ownership on wages take a long time (more than four years) to develop. Notes: reports estimates of (9), (10) 
Selection effects at the firm-level and the individual-level
Using the preferred fixed-effects methods, such as FE(s) or CMD, means that the parameter identifying the selection effect is not directly estimated. For example, in Equation (6), the treatment dummy T is swept away by the within-spell transformation. However, using CMD we can recover estimates of both the worker and the firm fixed component of wages, denoted θ i and ψ j . This allows us to compare their mean or their distribution between the treatment and control groups of each type.
In Figure 1 we plot the distribution of our estimates of ψ j and θ i for the control and treatment groups corresponding to those West German plants which were domestic in 2000. In both cases, as we would expect, we find that the distribution of the fixed unobserved component of wages for the treatment group lies to the right of that for the control group. This is another way of showing the selection effect, but one which decomposes the selection effect into two components: one relating to the firm, and one to the worker. The difference in the mean ofθ i is about 0.16 log-points, while the difference inψ j is about 0.058. In both cases, foreign takeover is associated with higher fixed worker-and plant-level characteristics, although it seems that the worker-level effect is quantitatively more important. 
Heterogeneity in the foreign ownership effect
Even if the average effect of changing ownership status is small, it might be that this disguises some larger or smaller effects for subgroups in the data. For example, foreignowned firms might implement a steeper wage-tenure profile, or might reward highlyskilled workers relatively more. The effects of foreign-owned firms might also vary by firm characteristic, such as size and profitability. A further benefit of linked employeremployee data is that we can disaggregate the foreign ownership effect by both worker characteristics and firm characteristics.
To enable comparison of a large number of coefficient estimates, we use graphical methods. In Figure 2 we plot the estimate of δ F for each sub-group of the data, together with its 95% confidence interval. For reference we also draw vertical lines showing the FE(s) pooled estimate of δ F = 0.027 and the null hypothesis δ F = 0. The subgroups we choose are based on those covariates described in Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2, and include worker and firm characteristics. Figure 2 enables us to see at a glance that confidence intervals for almost all sub-groups of the data include the pooled estimate, and most also include zero, which partly reflects the fact that the pooled estimate itself is only 0.027 with a standard error of 0.009. Thus we find little evidence that takeover effects are much larger or much smaller for subgroups of the data. The only notable exceptions are for workers in service occupations and for firms in the service sector, where there is evidence of larger takeover effects. The coefficient on δ F for service sector firms, for example, is 0.060. Thus, foreign firms do not appear to reward more highly-skilled occupations or more highly qualified individuals more.
Male Female
Basic manual occ.
Qualified manual occ.
Engineering occ.
Basic service occ.
Qualified service occ.
Semi−professional occ.
Professional occ.
Basic business occ.
Qualified business occ. In Figure 3 we repeat the exercise, but look at the takeover effect from domestic to foreign in East Germany. As Table 3 shows, our preferred pooled estimate for the δ F is effectively zero (0.011), and most sub-groups have confidence intervals which include zero.
Exceptions are workers in engineering and managerial occupations, which have much larger takeover effects, and workers in firms with high levels of exports. Finally, Figure 4 plots estimates and confidence intervals for the West German takeover effect. Once again, there is very little evidence here that takeover effects are significantly different from zero for any subgroup of the population, with the exception of one occupational group (professionals). Taken as a whole, these results confirm that once selection is taken into account, the true takeover effect is small for most groups.
Conclusion
We have shown how the treatment-effects framework can be used to estimate the "selection" and "takeover" components of the wage gap between foreign and domestic firms. With linked worker-firm data it is possible to use this framework to isolate the effects of selection on both plant and worker unobservable components of wages.
We find evidence of large selection effects both in terms of worker-and firm unobserved components of wages: plants which get taken over by foreign firms have higher plantlevel wages and higher individual-level wages before they are taken over. The selection effects are larger for East German plants, both for those which change to West German ownership and foreign ownership. Once the selection effect is taken into account, the genuine takeover effect is small and in some cases insignificantly different from zero. In contrast to the selection effect, the takeover effect is slightly larger in West Germany.
The framework we use also distinguishes between firms which change ownership status from domestic to foreign and vice versa. Most previous studies impose the restriction that these two effects are equal and opposite, as they would be if there was a simple wage bonus paid to workers in foreign-owned firms. In West Germany the takeover effect is 2.7% in one direction and −1.1% in the other direction. However, the latter is insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that workers do not suffer a significant wage loss when their firm reverts to domestic ownership. In addition, workers who leave foreign-owned plants and join domestic plants do not experience wage falls (as opposed to a wage increase of 5.5% for employees who leave domestically-owned plants and join foreign-owned). This evidence is supportive of the idea that foreign-owned firms might offer spillover benefits to the domestic economy. The use of linked data on workers and firms allows us to investigate whether there are any distributional consequences of ownership status. We split the sample by a number of possibly relevant characteristics and re-estimate the takeover effect. We find little evidence that takeover effects are much larger or much smaller for subgroups of the data. In particular, there is no systematic pattern in terms of skill or occupational groups: foreign-firms do not appear to change the reward structure within firms significantly once selection effects are accounted for.
One interpretation of these results is that the true impacts of ownership structure on the labour market are small, at least in Germany in the 21st century. A second possibility is that wage effects take a long time to manifest themselves. What we call the selection effect is not distinguishable in our data from the long-run effect on wages of foreign-ownership. (1975, 1980, 1985, 1988) 
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